Killing Innocents? Massacre, War, and Boundaries of Violence in Early Modern Europe by Braun, HE
1 
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This chapter explores a specific aspect of early modern European critique and justification of 
mass killing. The chosen prism is the mass killing or massacre of innocent victims in war, the 
group of victims most likely to be identified as non-combatants or collateral damage in 
contemporary parlance. The chapter draws primarily on sixteenth century European material 
- visual, theological and legal sources - in order to provide a rough sketch of the relationship 
between discourses and practices of violence. The picture that emerges points to a complex 
and deeply contextual dynamic in which a multitude of factors determined the definition and 










Violence is central to Christian theology and experience. Christ died a brutal death on the 
cross for the sake of the salvation of humanity. Ever since the time of the apostles, the 
attitude of Christian individuals and communities to violence has been extremely diverse, 
often ambiguous and troubled.1 Early modern Christianity generally accepted violence, not 
least violence in war, as an unavoidable and sometimes necessary or even desirable feature 
of life in the civitas terrena. Much depended on the causes or motivations for war. The 
suppression of heretics and rebels, the fight against Muslim opponents, and even the 
subjugation of non-European peoples who refused to accept Christianity were commonly 
sanctioned. Still, specific aspects of violence in war remained problematic for some early 
modern observers and inspired a desire to critique and a need for justification.  
The mass-killing or massacre of innocent victims in war – non-combatants or collateral 
damage in today’s parlance – was particularly problematic. In fact, the killing of non-
combatants – such as women and children, the elderly, also foreigners and travelers, even 
the male adult population not directly involved in fighting – had the potential to expose, 
challenge and forcefully resolve Christian ambivalence. Christian theology from Saint 
Augustine onwards sought to differentiate between lawful and unlawful violence and victims 
in war, often drawing on classical sources and paradigms (section one, ??). While theologians 
for the most part accommodated violence if it was exerted by legitimate authority and in 
defense of the Christian faith widely interpreted, the disruptive potential of violence lingered 
on especially where this large and diverse group was concerned. Depending on 
circumstances, Christian perpetrators of mass-killings could face criticism from members of 
their own group or faction. 
This was less likely to be the case if the destruction of civilian lives occurred in the 
context of religious civil war (such as the French Wars of Religion) or in the struggle against 
Islam. It was more likely to arise if the victims were members of a community that had been 
identified as a promising target for mission and conversion. This was the case of the 
Amerindian communities, for instance, and the pertinent efforts of Catholic theologians 
compelled to probe and redraw the boundaries of legitimate violence against civilian 
populations make up a good part of this chapter (section two, ??). Of course, theologians did 
not have the sole word on what did and what did not constitute lawful violence in war. 
Jurisprudents and political analysts, especially those identified with the notion of reason of 
state, put forward alternative perspectives on the killing of civilian populations (section three, 
??) Yet even the mass-killing of non-combatants belonging to a heretical or rebellious 
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community could attract ‘internal’ critique, especially when the use of violence for political 
ends exacted an unexpectedly high political price. The Spanish campaign against rebel Dutch 
provinces during the second half of the sixteenth century discussed below offers a case in 
point (section four, ?? ). 
Early modern critics and defenders of military violence against non-combatants drew 
on a wide range of normative sources from law, theology or classical and contemporary 
history. One point of reference was a biblical precedent for the unlawful use of violence 
against innocent people on the part of legitimate authority: the Bethlehemite ‘Slaughter of 
the Holy Innocents’ (Matthew 2, 16-18). The infants murdered at the order of King Herod in 
the hope of killing Christ became the first Christian martyrs and a motif in subsequent 
religious and political polemic. Christian art — from Romanesque Sculpture to Raphael, from 
Peter Paul Rubens to Nicolas Poussin — repeatedly returned to the narrative and gave visual 
currency to the horror and the potential recrimination associated with this act of killing 
children. While these works were produced in very varied contexts, they invariably aimed to 
instruct and move Christian viewers and thus consolidate their sense of themselves as 
members of a community characterized by compliance with a specific set of values, including 
values concerning the uses of violence. Together these images constituted a supra-
confessional trope for the transgression of over-arching boundaries of violence on the part of 
Christian authority.2  
One example is the painting Matteo di Giovanni (c.1435-1495) produced for the 
Sienese church of Sant’Agostino in 1482.3 It is dominated by a tumult of shocking acts of 
brutality. Swords are thrust into tiny mouths, iron-shod feet trample on little bodies, the limbs 
of victims and perpetrators entangle in deadly, suffocating confusion. The faces of mothers 
and children express terror or carry the pallor of death. Di Giovanni captured something of 
the horror of massacre. 
 
Image: Matteo di Giovanni, Massacre of the Innocents, 1482, Sant’Agostino, Siena (now 
Ospedale Santa Maria della Scala, Siena). 
 
The perpetrator — King Herod, depicted in the regal splendor of an oriental, presumably 
Islamic ruler — indulges in the carnage happening before his eyes. His counsellors show varied 
expressions of detachment, regret and dejection. The painting is more than a mere vehicle 
for invigorating empathy and solidarity with the first Christian martyrs among the early 
modern audience. Di Giovanni translated the wretched event of massacre into revulsion 
directed at the perpetrator and confirmed Herod as the Christian archetype for authority 
defiled by transgression of established boundaries of violence. The viewer is implicitly 
encouraged to share and assert a specific set of values and related emotions, and could feel 
invited to reflect on what constituted lawful violence.4  
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The work of Di Giovanni and other artists are part of a wider and highly differentiated 
European discourse on the rights and wrongs of killing defenseless civilians. Within this 
discourse, the motif of the Slaughter of the Innocents could serve as a foil against which 
members of the Christian community judged acts of violence perpetrated by governmental 
or semi-governmental agents. Di Giovanni’s painting — and perhaps even more so the 
artwork by Frans Hogenberg, Hendrick Goltzius and Pieter Brueghel the Younger mentioned 
below — captured the fact that massacre could bring the Christian perpetrator perilously 
close to Herodian monstrosity and mark him as guilty of excessive, repulsive, ‘un-Christian’ 




Killing Innocents in Christian ius in bello 
 
Much of early modern Christian European legal and theological discussion of mass killings and 
violence against civilians is found in literatures and passages dealing with “just conduct in 
war” (ius in bello), itself usually part of a wider discussion of the right of legitimate authority 
to go to war (ius ad bellum).5 The just war tradition is commonly traced back to Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, and especially Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 — 430 AD). Plato stated that 
the aim of war was to establish peace; Aristotle formulated the idea that war requires a just 
cause; and Cicero specified that war could be conducted only by proper authority. Augustine 
added two subjective elements to these seemingly objective conditions: that the exercise of 
violence in just war had to be proportionate and that violence had to be exercised with due 
discrimination. Both distinctions shaped subsequent Christian approaches to mass killing.  
Concerning acceptable use of violence, Augustine boiled the issue down to the 
demand that just war had to be fought with the right intention. While there is considerable 
debate concerning Augustine’s position, the existing consensus is perhaps best illustrated by 
an often-cited passage from Contra Faustum: 
 
What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, [so] that 
others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not any religious 
feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and 
implacable enmity, wild resistance, the lust of power, and such like; and it is generally 
to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in 
obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars (…).6 
 
Augustine suggested that the unintended killing of an innocent person was not problematic 
as such. It became unacceptable only if it was the result of sinful motivation such as “love of 
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violence”. A virtuous commander who accepted the death of innocent people for the sake of 
restoring justice and punishing wrongdoers or a soldier obeying orders were not to blame. 
The political, social, moral and legal status as well as the age or gender of those who became 
‘collateral damage’ in just war was effectively irrelevant.  
 Most accounts of the Christian just war tradition assume that Saint Augustine inspired 
a basic historical continuity regarding the death of innocents in warfare, from Saint Thomas 
Aquinas in the thirteenth century to Francisco Vitoria, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius in 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. In this view, the basic consensus from late 
antiquity to early modernity was that actions that the foreseeable but unintended killing of 
innocents represented just conduct in war. The unqualified prohibition of intentionally killing 
innocents is said to have marked the Christian boundary between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence.  
 However, as Daniel H. Weiss has recently shown, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225—1274 
AD) does not fit so easily into the alleged Christian European consensus concerning the 
foreseeable but unintended killing of innocents in war.7 Aquinas synthesized a host of 
previously disparate ideas into a more systematic doctrine of just war and, perhaps most 
significantly, incorporated the idea of the proportionality of means and ends. This sense of 
proportionality extended to the treatment of civilians in war. A crucial passage in his Summa 
Theologiae (II—II, Q.64, A.6) reads: 
 
A man can be looked at in two ways, in isolation and in some context. Now, 
considering every man in isolation, it is not legitimate to kill any man. Every man, even 
the sinner, has a nature which God made, and which as such we are bound to love, 
whereas we violate it by killing him. It nevertheless remains true (...) that sin corrodes 
the common good and so justifies the killing of the sinner, whereas the life of just men 
preserves and promotes the common good, since they constitute the bulk of the 
people. There is, therefore, simply no justification for taking the life of an innocent 
person. 
 
Here, Aquinas posited that in order to be legitimate, the killing of a person required not only 
virtuous intention on the part of the agent, but also a specific status of the person killed. The 
person to be killed had to be a sinner and an aggressor. While Aquinas never expressly 
prohibited the unintended death of innocents in war, he also never indicated that just war 
legitimized the killing of innocents.8 The overarching theological principles that grounded his 
thinking suggest that his views differed from those of Saint Augustine. At the end of his 
discussion of the famous parable of the wheat and the tare (Matthew, 13:24—30), for 




(…) the Lord teaches that the wicked are to be allowed to live and to have their 
punishment deferred until the Last Judgement rather than that the good should be 
killed at the same time. Where, however, the good are in no danger but, on the 
contrary, stand to gain security, the wicked may legitimately be killed.9 
 
If the choice was between killing innocent people in the pursuit of justice and sparing the 
wicked to avoid collateral victims, Christian authorities should always choose the latter over 
the former. The Dominican theologian was much less inclined to sanction the foreseen but 
unintended killing of innocents than is often suggested. In short, the death of innocents in 
war continued to trouble medieval scholastic thinkers.  
 
Victims of War in Francisco Vitoria 
 
This continued anxiety concerning the killing of innocents in war is evident, for instance, in 
the writings of the Dominican friar and professor of theology at Salamanca, Francisco Vitoria 
(1483 — 1546). Vitoria was no pacifist. He accepted and in fact defended the clearly defined 
and restricted use of violence as a possible last resort in specific circumstances. Yet a deep 
unease and concomitant desire to restrict the use of violence pervade his work. Where 
Spanish expansion in the Americas is concerned, abhorrence of the injustice and brutality of 
conquest bubbles and boils underneath the argument. 
Vitoria expressed immense personal frustration with the discrepancy between the 
violence of conquest and Christian ideals of charity and justice in war. In a letter to his superior 
Miguel de Arcos OP dated 8 November 1534, he felt compelled to state  “that after a lifetime 
of studies and long experience, no business shocks me or embarrasses me more than the 
corrupt profits and affairs of the Indies.” 10 He went so far as to say that he “no longer 
understands the justice of war”. Eyewitnesses, he told his superior, had reliably informed him 
that the Inca ruler Atahualpa and his people had not injured the Spanish in the slightest nor 
given them the least ground for war. He could only conclude, therefore, that even if the 
emperor possessed just titles to conquer the Amerindians, “the Indians do not and cannot 
know this [and] are most certainly innocents in this war”.11 The emphasis on the ‘innocence’ 
of the Amerindian peoples summarily identified them as victims of unlawful violence and 
deliberately conjured up the image of biblical, Herodian transgression.12  
A few years later, Vitoria organised his views in two famous lectures on just war and 
just conduct of war in the new world — On the American Indians (De Indis) and On the Law of 
War (De iure belli) [delivered in 1539, first published in 1557] — which quickly became 
essential points of reference for subsequent thinking about international relations. Right at 
the beginning of On the American Indians, Vitoria told his students — the future governors, 
judges and officers running the Spanish empire — that his lectures were inspired by what “we 
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hear (…) of bloody massacres and of innocent individuals pillaged for their possessions and 
dominions”. While somewhat disingenuously claiming that he did not wish “to stir up fresh 
contentions”, he made clear that news received from the Americas proved that “there are 
grounds for doubting the justice of what has been done”.  
On the American Indians firmly established that indigenous peoples possessed ‘true 
dominion’ and the capability of owning property and ruling themselves under natural law. 
Vitoria demolished several ‘unjust titles’ of conquest — such as the idea of natural slavery or 
the refusal to accept the Christian faith — and established eight legitimate titles for waging 
war against the Amerindians. While he wavered and modified some of his positions in the 
course of the lecture,13 Vitoria maintained throughout that indigenous political autonomy had 
to be respected and the use of violence be a very last resort. 
In one of the most substantial and influential parts of the lecture, the discussion of the 
right of the Spanish to travel, trade and dwell freely among foreign peoples under the law of 
nations (On the American Indians, Question 3, Article 1), Vitoria stressed the obligation to 
avoid doing harm and prioritise negotiation, reasoning and persuasion over violence. He 
acknowledged that the Spanish might lawfully go to war if indigenous peoples should “deny 
[them] what is theirs by the law of nations”.14 Yet he also emphasized the need to show 
special restraint if the adversary sincerely albeit erroneously believed to wage a just war. Even 
if it were the case that the Spanish had done their best “to reassure [the Amerindians] and 
convince them of their peaceful intentions (…), the barbarians may still be understandably 
fearful of men whose customs seem so strange, and who they can see are armed and much 
stronger than themselves”.15 If this fear moved the Amerindians to attack the Spanish, the 
latter could respond “within the bounds of blameless self-defence”. Vitoria stressed the 
Spanish obligation “to do (…) as little harm to the barbarians as is possible since this is merely 
a defensive war” and that they had no title to looting or occupation. The presumption of 
innocence and defensive action — though frequently reinforced by disparaging 
characterisation of Amerindians as “cowardly, foolish, and ignorant”, “barbarians”, or a “weak 
and childish foe” — was firmly in favour of indigenous Amerindian communities.  
In his second lecture, On the Law of War, Vitoria examined just conduct in war in more 
detail.16 He took the traditional view and looked at the harm inflicted on the lives and 
property of combatants and non-combatants from the point of view of the ‘just belligerent’ 
entitled to punish an offender. His assessment of acceptable levels of punitive violence was 
rooted in the notion — fundamental to scholastic natural law theory — that the sovereign 
had received authority from the commonwealth or the people as a corporate body politic. 
The citizens of a state waging an unjust war were culpable of aggression and legitimate targets 
for punishment, albeit to greatly varying degrees. Vitoria articulated the overwhelming 
scholastic consensus that all members of an aggressor state could be subject to confiscation 
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of property in order to satisfy a penalty imposed by a just victor. Those subjects more directly 
responsible for the waging of unjust war, however, could suffer death as due punishment.  
Accordingly, Vitoria offered limited protection to enemy soldiers, since they were the 
ones who were to a large degree responsible for the injury inflicted on the just belligerent.17 
The prince waging a just war might even kill enemy combatants who had surrendered, 
especially if they had failed or refused to secure terms of surrender. Their execution could be 
a legitimate act of punishment and serve as deterrence and a means to ensure peace. Yet 
Vitoria also insisted that punitive mass killing had to be proportionate to the damage suffered 
at the hands of the aggressor and serve the common good by preventing rather than 
provoking future conflicts. It might therefore be “lawful and expedient to kill all the enemy 
combatants” in a situation where “security cannot be obtained without the wholesale 
destruction of the enemy”.  
This legitimate need to kill enemy combatants, however, usually arose only in the “war 
against the infidel”.18 Vitoria wanted to see the biblical precept of Deuteronomy 20: 10-14 
restricted to Muslim combatants.19 In wars against “fellow Christians”, on the other hand, the 
wholesale slaughter of prisoners of war was counterproductive and simply “not 
permissible”.20 Vitoria’s reasoning was that Christian combatants on both sides acted in good 
faith and that “soldiers on each side who come to fight in battle or to defend a city are all 
equally innocent”. Their execution represented a punishment that did not “fit the crime” and 
was likely to provoke further wars between princes.  
The Dominican theologian underscored this point when discussing the case of popular 
rebellion as a kind of irregular warfare where the boundary between combatants and non-
combatants was notoriously fluid. His point of reference was the Massacre of Thessalonica 
(390 AD), which allegedly earned the emperor Theodosius I excommunication at the hands of 
St Ambrose of Milan.21 The emperor had the entire population of Thessalonica executed as a 
punishment for rebellion — regardless of age, gender and the fact that they were Christians 
and Roman citizens. Theodosius’s action was considered a vindictive act grossly 
disproportionate to the injury suffered and drew such severe criticism from contemporaries 
that the emperor was compelled to submit to penitence. Anthonis van Dyck’s painting, now 
in the National Gallery in London, is one example of the iconographic legacy of this act of 
transgression challenged and censored by ecclesiastical authority. 
 
Anthonis van Dyck, Saint Ambrose and Emperor Theodosius (St. Ambrose barring Theodosius 
from Milan Cathedral), 1620, The National Gallery, London, UK  
 
Vitoria referred to Thessalonica as evidence that “when dealing with our fellow members of 
the commonwealth”, even where “the crime is the responsibility of the entire city or province, 
it is not lawful to kill all the delinquents”. He purposely echoed Aquinas when he asserted 
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that “it is never lawful in itself intentionally to kill innocent persons” either during or after a 
battle or siege.22  
Vitoria, then, aimed to afford the lives of those “innocent of offense” — those who 
had little or no agency in a theatre of war, including women, children and the elderly  — a 
higher degree of protection.23 While Christian adult males in a surrendered city did not 
necessarily enjoy the same protection, they must not be put to death indiscriminately. Vitoria 
also made clear that Amerindian populations were to be treated in the same way as Christians 
and not like the Muslim ‘infidel’. The lives — though not necessarily the property — of both 
Christian and Amerindian adversaries in a putative just war were protected the overarching 
rule that punishment had to be proportionate to the crime of the sovereign aggressor as well 
as the level of involvement on the part of the citizen, and must serve to prevent rather than 
provoke future wars. 
The Dominican went on to insist that “[e]ven in wars against the Turks (…) we may not 
kill children, who are obviously innocent, nor women, who are presumed innocent at least as 
far as the war is concerned”. The overall protection of civilian lives could extend to adult male 
Muslim non-combatants.24 While adult male “Saracens” presented a future danger, Vitoria 
posited, it was “quite unacceptable that a person should be killed for a sin he has yet to 
commit”. At this point, Vitoria again struggled with the provisions of the Book of 
Deuteronomy. What is written there, he conceded, appeared to have been intended as a 
“general rule”: “the Lord seems to have meant (…) that (…) all the adult men in an enemy city 
are to be thought of as enemies, since the innocent cannot be distinguished from the guilty, 
and therefore they may all be killed.”25 Though he wavered, Vitoria still preferred to protect 
Muslim male adult civilians from what he considered extreme, inherently un-Christian 
punitive violence.  
Overall, the discussion in On the Law of War exemplifies the morally and politically 
complex and persistently problematic nature of killing innocents. While allowing for the 
probable but still accidental and unintentional killing of ‘innocents’ in just war, Vitoria sought 
to retain something of the spirit of Aquinas’ interpretation of Matthew 13: 24-30 (the 
“Parable of the Tares”). He sought to insist on proportionality of punitive action throughout, 
often including examples that would align legal-theological argument with the reality of 
warfare. For instance, he did not permit “indiscriminate bombardment” that would kill large 
numbers of innocents in order to take a town or fortress of little strategic importance or in 
order to defeat a small number of enemy combatants.  
Subsequent scholastic debate continued along similar lines.26 One example is the 
Jesuit theologian Francisco Suárez (1548—1617), who agreed with Vitoria’s general premise 
concerning human agency in war, proportionality of punishment, and the relative culpability 
of those ‘innocent of offense’. He did, however, notice the lack of precision in Vitoria’s 
treatment of the question of whether it was lawful to kill the civilian adult male population 
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after the surrender of a city. Without distinguishing between Christian and infidel, the Jesuit 
affirmed that natural law included among the innocents “those who are able to bear arms, if 
it is evident that, in other respects, they have not shared in the crime nor in the unjust war.”27 
Only individuals proven to have taken an active part in the fighting should be regarded as 
combatants and be subject to the penalty of death. More pressingly than Vitoria, Suárez 
appeared to assert the presumption of innocence in the absence of clear evidence of 
individual culpability.  
 Though vulnerable to expansive differentiation, then, the category of relative 
culpability and proportionality of punishment continued to guide scholastic thinking on the 
matter. The boundaries between proportionate and disproportionate, lawful and unlawful 
violence remained fluid and under debate. This left the intellectual and moral space for 
identifying and condemning acts of violence against civilian populations as a Slaughter of the 
Innocents, unjust, and tantamount to Herodian transgression.  
   
 
Mass Killing and the Ethics of Violence in Reason of State and Alberico Gentili  
 
Among the authors opposed to the scholastic approach and often labelled ‘realist’ observers 
of politics, war and violence, Niccoló Machiavelli (1469-1527) is known as the one least 
inclined to reflect on human suffering and the morality of killing innocents.28 Harking back to 
classical Greek and Roman history, Machiavelli intended to set a counterpoint to traditional 
scholastic and humanist analysis and evaluation of political power. Whether in The Prince 
(c.1513) or in his Discourses on the First Decade of Livy (c.1519), he simply wanted to set out 
the best way to gain and retain power and wage war. Like his ancient counterpart Thucydides, 
the Florentine posited that the necessity of gaining, retaining and expanding power dictates 
the appropriate use of violence.  
His discussion of the “savage cruelty and inhumanity” of Agathocles, the tyrant of 
Syracuse (317—289 BC) exemplifies his perspective. While “one cannot call it virtue to kill 
one’s citizens, betray one’s friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion”, 
Machiavelli stated, “these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but no glory.”29 While 
the absence of glory was regrettable, it could be a price worth paying under certain 
circumstances. The point Machiavelli wanted to make was that Agathocles knew how to use 
cruelty well: that he struck quickly, unexpectedly, decisively, and not too often.  
Unsurprisingly, Machiavelli did not shrink back from the punitive mass-killing of 
rebellious subject populations. Necessity demanded that the “middle way” be avoided and 
that “subject peoples should either be generously treated or wiped out.”30 The killing of 
innocent civilians — an act of genocide, if we consider the extinction of an ancient or 
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Renaissance civic community with a distinct political and cultural identity as genocide — were 
but another tool in the armoury of princely or republican power.  
The absence of compassion or anything resembling Christian-scholastic abhorrence of 
violence especially against innocents is striking, but by no means isolated. The maverick ex-
Jesuit Giovanni Botero (1544-1617 AD), one of the most influential political authors of the 
later sixteenth and early seventeenth century, did not stray too far from Machiavelli when it 
came to mass-killing civilians. In the fifth book of his Ragion di stato (first published in 1589), 
Botero discussed the treatment of “subjects acquired by conquest”.31 The discussion focuses 
on “infidels and heretics”, Muslim as well as Protestant and Calvinist populations recently 
subjected to Catholic authority. Unlike The Prince, Botero’s argument reflected the unfolding 
reality of early modern European religious war.  
Botero advised the ruler to weaken heretical and infidel subjects and facilitate 
conversion through disruption and suppression of tradition, identity, established social 
hierarchy, laws and use of language as well as forced dislocation of communities. If, however, 
these measures were not to have the desired effect of pacification and conversion, the ruler 
should emulate the “resolve” of Lucius Pinarius, governor of Enna in Sicily in 214 BC.32 
Confronted with the possibility of a rebellion he would have found difficult to suppress, 
Pinarius executed the entire population of the city. Botero approvingly referred to him as “a 
stern man [who], in order not to be deceived, trusted himself rather than the loyalty of the 
people.” While this discussion concerned the submission of infidels and heretics, Botero 
insinuated that the rule could apply to “all those who [stubbornly] will not submit” to 
legitimate rule.  
Botero’s ruthlessness was rooted in his experience of confessional conflict and was 
bolstered by his knowledge of Roman history. The Italian Protestant Alberico Gentili (1552-
1608 AD), too, drew on ancient, especially Roman history as well as his (personal) experience 
of European confessional politics. Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University and one 
of the three “Fathers of International Law” (Vitoria and Grotius complete the triumvirate), he 
drew even more heavily on Roman law and the work of civilians and legal humanists like 
Raphaël Fulgosius (1367-1427) and Andrea Alciato (1492-1550). His most famous work, De 
iure belli libri tres (On the Law of War in Three Books; first published as a single text in 1598), 
Gentili combined a keen eye for the history and contemporary practice of warfare with a 
sense for political complexity and a desire to establish a normative yet pragmatic framework 
for the conduct of war. 33   
Gentili departed from the scholastic notion of just war and rejected the idea of war as 
a process in which only one belligerent had the right to enforce a rightful claim or redeem an 
injury and enact punishment. Instead, he fully endorsed the Roman concept of ‘public war’ 
between sovereign belligerents with equal rights.34 He defined ‘public’ or ‘regular war’ as an 
action regulated by international law (ius gentium), itself understood as a set of positive laws 
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agreed by most or all sovereign entities and based in historical experience, military practice 
and natural reason and reflected in legal tradition (most notably the ius civile).35 In the 
absence of a common arbiter, war itself became the final judge of whether a cause was just. 
Victory established the new legal situation between belligerents. Most famously, perhaps, 
Gentili aggressively expanded the boundaries of pre-emptive strike far beyond what 
scholastic authors had deemed acceptable and sketched the notion of ‘preventive strike’ or 
‘preventive war’.36 
The discussion of the treatment of hostages, prisoners of war and civilian populations 
takes up the second book of On the Law of War. Gentili’s treatment of these groups was 
aligned with his overarching notion of ‘public war’. Like Vitoria before him, Gentili advocated 
necessity tempered by proportionality as a rule for the conduct of war. Unlike Vitoria and the 
scholastics, though, Gentili anchored the protection of defenseless or innocent people in the 
rules of war themselves. He extracted these rules or “laws of war” from a plethora of 
examples from ancient and contemporary military practice buffeted by references to 
historians (including Machiavelli), the ius civile and the civilians as well as Scripture and the 
Church Fathers. Just conduct in war became a matter of reciprocity and of binding contractual 
agreements — such as a truce or a negotiated surrender — between enemies. The result was 
a code of lawful conduct in war that was highly differentiated and seemingly rooted in ‘best 
practice’ of centuries of warfare.  
In the first instance, Gentili distinguished between combatants “taken captive” — that 
is, combatants who fought to the point where further resistance had become completely 
futile — and combatants who had negotiated a surrender.37 He argued against the killing of 
the former on the grounds that capturing soldiers weakened the enemy as much as killing 
them. Accordingly, he condemned historical massacres of prisoners-of-war, including the 
killing of the soldiers and sailors of the Spanish Armada wrecked on the Irish shore, as “act[s] 
contrary to the laws of war”.38 He was particularly scathing about the idea that enemy soldiers 
who obstinately resisted before surrender should be punished by death for their loyalty to 
their sovereign.39 Those who surrendered were protected by “the rights of humanity and the 
laws of war”.40  
The exception to this general rule was the case of captives who had surrendered but 
were guilty of “actions contrary to the nature of warfare”, such as the obstinate and mutually 
costly defense of unfortified and strategically insignificant places.41 The principle underlying 
this was that of “excess” in warfare. His observation was that such excess was often caused 
by inexperience or ignorance of known etiquette and practices of warfare and hence of the 
laws of war. It was this notion of “excess” and ignorant or willful violation of commonly 
accepted laws of war that was played out during the Flanders campaign of the Duke of Alba 
discussed below.   
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When Gentili came to discuss defenseless civilian populations, he firmly asserted that 
non-combatants — women, children, the feeble and elderly as well as defenseless adult males 
— must not be killed intentionally. He added two exceptions to this rule. The first concerned 
women who chose to bear and exercise arms. They were subject to the same rules as male 
combatants.42 The second reflected his overarching principle of reciprocity: women and 
children in a conquered city may be killed if the enemy had done likewise before.43 The second 
exception was also a concession to “the command of God”44, yet one that he was quick to 
qualify as “extraordinary”. Gentili concluded that even if “the enemy wrong[ed] our women 
and children” “we ought always to incline rather towards mercy, which in this case will lead 
us to spare women and children, according to the precepts of the law of God, of nature and 
of the state.”45  
Overall, the discussion in book two of On the Laws of War aimed at reducing 
bloodshed that served no strategic or tactical purpose. Gentili outlawed the merely vengeful 
punitive mass killing of enemy combatants who had surrendered. Notably, the motive of 
punishing soldiers for the crimes (including the heresy) of their lord — a factor of continued 
importance in scholastic legal thought — had dropped from Gentili’s conceptual horizon.  
Gentili, early modern scholastic theologians, and many subsequent authors 
commenting on just conduct in war continued to employ some form of a correlation between 
sovereignty, culpability and individual agency as the measure for legitimate punishment of 
combatants and non-combatants. They routinely distinguished between violence against 
property and violence against the human body. The degree to which the private individual 
and especially the non-combatant could be held liable for the transgressions of her or his 
sovereign was a matter of ongoing debate. Violence against civilians and especially the mass-
killing of non-combatants, however, had to be carefully considered and justified — not just 
by theorists, but, depending on circumstances, by practitioners of military violence, too. 
 
 
The Political Cost of Massacre: Alba’s fateful Campaign of “Terror” 
 
One example of a situation in which escalating violence against civilian populations spiraled 
out of political control is the Spanish campaign in Flanders (1567-73) during the first decade 
of the Eighty Years war (1566-1648), the series of conflicts which eventually led to the 
formation of the Dutch Republic.46 The mass-killing of civilians in the course of the campaign 
exposed the fluidity of rules of war notionally guiding military conduct, escalated the conflict 
between the Spanish Habsburg crown and the seventeen rebellious Dutch provinces, and 
provoked a backlash even among Habsburg loyalists and officials.  
The Spanish commander, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo y Pimentel, third Duke of Alba 
(1507-1582) and his staff favored aggressive tactics that put rapid success and confessional 
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ire before more traditional notions of military decorum.47 Alba refused to afford rebels and 
heretics the privileges of military protocol and identified those who fought against Philip II of 
Spain as irregular combatants not protected by laws of war or rules of chivalric behavior. 
Spanish troops summarily executed Dutch prisoners of war. On at least one occasion, the 
duke even suspended the customary protection of heralds and put to death Dutch envoys 
offering exchange of prisoners.48 While this conduct was still loosely aligned with 
contemporary military practice and notions of ius in bello  — those taking up arms against 
lawful authority could generally expect less lenient treatment than combatants serving in the 
regular armies of a sovereign belligerent — it quickly invited Dutch reprisals.  
Alba’s approach to civilian populations proved even more problematic. The duke 
distinguished between towns held down by Dutch garrisons and those which had willingly 
rebelled against Philip II. The latter could not expect the usual terms. For instance, they would 
not be allowed to sue for terms of surrender at the point just before siege artillery had been 
brought to bear on their walls. In letters to his monarch, Alba professed his hatred of heresy 
and rebellion and spoke in the harshest terms of his determination to visit rebel towns with 
the wholesale destruction of their economy and civilian population.49 In fact, the impact of 
“terror” — punitive sackings and casual acceptance of civilian deaths during or after sieges — 
was integral to Alba’s strategy of securing a quick victory by means of sustained intimidation. 
The vicious sacking of Mechelen in 1572 was exemplary in this respect. The town had 
been abandoned by the troops of the Prince of Orange by the time the Spanish troops arrived. 
The citizens had opened the gates and sent a delegation to negotiate a surrender. Alba 
demanded unconditional surrender and the acceptance of a garrison, the latter a sore point 
even for the most loyal of towns in the Low Countries. When his demands were refused, he 
allowed his men — in order “to refresh themselves a little”,50 and also because he needed to 
find a way to pay them — to plunder the city for several days.51 Murder, atrocity, torture and 
rape — widely and vividly reported, sometimes exaggerated in contemporary and subsequent 
accounts — were the foreseeable consequence. Some years later, in 1581, an anonymous 
Dutch Calvinist memorial lamented that the Spanish at Mechelen had “spared neither friend 
nor foe, widow or orphan, young or old, poor or rich”.52 
Dutch commanders immediately retaliated with similarly transgressive behavior. 
During the siege of Naarden later that year, Spanish officers were lured out of their trenches 
by false requests for parley and shot by the Dutch. Stubborn, increasingly vicious Dutch 
resistance triggered excessively vengeful behavior on the part of the Spanish. After the fall of 
the town, Alba’s soldiers murdered almost all the male citizens. The duke felt it opportune to 
boast to his monarch that “no man born, soldiers and burghers, had escaped”.53  
The duke’s bragging soon began to sound hollow. His campaign of “terror” had 
initiated an escalating cycle of reciprocal violation of codes of military conduct without any 
clear operational benefit. Rather than solicit the surrender of other cities as Mechelen had 
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done earlier in the year, the subsequent “bloedbads” at the towns of Naarden and Zutphen 
strengthened the resolve of the Dutch rebels and mobilized European support for their 
cause.54 The towns — not least through determined efforts on the part of rebel propaganda 
— became iconic places in the Protestant and wider European political imagination. They 
quickly aligned with reports of real or alleged atrocities in the Americas and fed into an ever 
more powerful anti-Spanish, pan-confessional, pan-European ‘Black Legend’. Alba’s “terror” 
inflicted a severe and lasting loss of political capital on the Habsburg monarchy.  
This was the case not least because many Dutch Catholics and even Habsburg loyalists 
and officials shared in the outrage. One visual manifestation of this outrage are the iconic 
engravings and prints of the “Spanish Fury” bearing down on defenseless civilians regardless 
of confessional allegiance produced by the Flemish artist Frans Hogenberg (1540-1590), a 
Catholic born in Mechelen, expelled from Antwerp by Alba in 1568 and subsequently settling 
in Cologne.55 Hogenberg’s graphic depictions of shocking violence against defenseless 
civilians marked Spanish as transgressive and had the potential to reach across confessional 
boundaries.   
 
Frans Hogenberg, The Conquest of Naarden, c. 1572-1590, Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, 
Rotterdam, Netherlands 
 
The anonymous author of the Discours du Pillage de Malines [Mechelen], a Habsburg loyalist 
hostile to the Dutch rebels, reported unspeakable examples of gendered violence — young 
girls and married women raped, women hung by their breasts, pregnant women stabbed in 
the stomach — and shocking acts of sacrilege against Catholic churches and reliquaries.56 Jean 
Richardot — eyewitness and career civil servant in the Spanish Habsburg administration — 
expressed his dismay at Alba’s strategy and his disgust with the human cost it incurred in a 
report to the Grand Council in Brussels: “One could say a lot more, if the horror of it did not 
make one’s hair stand on end — not at recounting it, but at remembering it!”57 In Madrid, the 
humanist and political counsellor Fadrique Furió Ceriol — soon to join the entourage of Alba’s 
successor as governor, Don Luis de Requesens — expressed his despair at the moral and 
political harm, fiscal and human cost, and overall futility of Alba’s campaign.58 Compassion, 
royal clemency and political compromise, Furió Ceriol insisted, were more likely to return the 
rebellious provinces to Philip II than the brutality of Spanish arms.  
Eventually, the duke paid the price for military failure and political fiasco. In 1573, he 
was recalled to Madrid. A subsequent official investigation harmed Alba’s reputation and the 
career of some of his officers and sparked a lively public debate in Spain about the rights and 
wrongs of the Flanders campaign. In his Commentarios,59 Bernardino de Mendoza, one of 
Alba’s veteran cavalry commanders, justified Spanish strategy with reference to ancient 
Rome. Like the Roman generals, Alba had struggled to civilize northern “barbarians”. “Reason 
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of war”, not least the need to sow division and hatred among Dutch Catholics and Calvinists, 
Mendoza suggested, amply justified blatant violation of established military etiquette, 
including the hanging of envoys and the ruthless pursuit of complete victory at the cost of 
civilian lives. The intervention of Mendoza and other veterans, however, could not gloss over 
the resounding failure of Alba’s plan or placate those whose conscience, political reasoning 
or understanding of the laws of war disagreed with the conduct of Spanish arms. 
While diplomatic expediency and concerns about public opinion tempered violence in 
subsequent years,60 the pan-European indignation caused by the Sack of Antwerp on 8 
November 1576 proved something of a watershed for the Flanders theatre of war. The brutal 
plundering of a Catholic city under Habsburg control by mutinous tercios claiming their pay 
— carefully planned by Spanish commanders under one of Alba’s former officers, Sancho 
D’Avila — was unprecedented. The news of the atrocity travelled fast and far. Outrage and 
revulsion at the actions of the Spanish military was, again, fueled by detailed illustrations of 
barbaric acts of violence — real or alleged — that were produced by Frans Hogenberg and 
other artists.  
 
Frans Hogenberg, The Sack of Antwerp, 1576 
 
The violence was the more shocking as the victims were not only defenseless civilians, but 
members of the Catholic faith. The catastrophic destruction of property and loss of thousands 
of Catholic civilian lives pushed rebels and loyalists, Catholics and Calvinists, to cast their 
differences aside. In the Pacification of Ghent signed only four days after the sack, they united 
to demand the withdrawal of Spanish troops from the Netherlands. Philip II was forced to 
oblige and to agree to subject the Spanish commanders involved to what amounted to an 
investigation for war crimes.  
Though only a temporary sticking plaster to the political-religious disagreements 
between the Catholic and Calvinist provinces, the Sack of Antwerp and the Pacification of 
Ghent effectively erased Habsburg gains made during the previous decade. They also help 
explain the determined change of political-military conduct introduced by Alessandro 
Farnese, Duke of Parma, who commanded the Army of Flanders from 1578 to 1592. Farnese 
made a gradual, if not necessarily coherent, effort to restore a sense of reciprocal respect 
between the enemies — a sense of reciprocity reflected in Gentili’s conceptualization of rules 
of war — facilitating prisoner exchanges and increasing the protection of the lives and 






Historical scholarship has suggested that mass killings were common and ingrained in early 
modern culture of war to the point where denial almost never occurred before the end of the 
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries.62 In the modern era, on the 
contrary, massacres are often reported as a ‘battle’ or military engagement and perpetrators 
go to great length to ‘cover up’. The legal and theological literature of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries and the contemporary response to Alba’s campaign of “terror” in the 
Low Countries, however, complicate this picture. There were political and military 
repercussions and there was public debate about the legitimacy of killing defenseless people, 
including those presumed guilty of heresy and rebellion.  
The damage to Spanish Habsburg reputation is illustrated by visual communications 
drawing clear parallels between the Bethlehemite Slaughter of the Holy Innocents and events 
in the Low Countries.63 The etching (1584) by Hendrick Goltzius captured not only the 
suffering of the Holy Innocents and their mothers, but forcefully emphasized the potential 
risk born by the perpetrators of such transgressive violence.64 Goltzius shows open despair 
and revulsion on the part of Herod’s own advisors and officials: here is a ruler ignorant or 
indifferent to irreparable damage he himself inflicted upon his authority.  
 
Hendrick Goltzius, Massacre of the Innocents, 1584. 
 
The painting (1610) by Pieter Brueghel the Younger transposed Bethlehem into a familiar 
European winter landscape. The victims of Spanish violence become contemporary, trans-
confessional “everyman” and “everywoman”. The Duke of Alba, accordingly — placed into 
the near centre of the painting and clearly identified by his silver-sabled beard — is cast as 
the executor of Philip II’s Herodian transgression.65  
 
Pieter Brueghel the Younger (after Pieter Brueghel the Elder), Massacre of the Innocents, 
1610, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna, Austria 
 
In both visualisations of massacre, the victims of Philip’s orders and Alba’s executions are 
represented as Holy Innocents: as members of a trans-confessional Christian community of 
faith, emotion and mutual obligation. Philip II and the Duke of Alba in turn are identified as 
perpetrators of a kind of violence – the murder of defenseless civilians — that appeals to a 
shared Christian tradition and potentially transcends and neutralizes confessional hostility.   
The Spanish Habsburgs could never wholly wash off the stain of atrocities committed 
at Mechelen, Naarden, Zutphen, at other places of Dutch resistance, and at Antwerp, even 
within Catholic Europe. Whether such acts of mass killing came to be considered transgressive 
by members of the perpetrators’ own community did depend then — and does depend today 
— on specific, complex combinations of political, cultural and juridical variables. Some we 
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have tentatively explored in this chapter. A brief survey of modern events — from My Lai to 
Srebrenica and to the Rwandan genocide — tells us that the global struggle to define those 
variables and prevent or contain unlawful and excessive violence is ongoing. 
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